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Game Theory, the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
and the Book of Mormon
Robert F. Schwartz

In all of man’s written record there has been a preoccupation with conflict
of interest; possibly only the topics of God, love, and inner struggle have
received comparable attention.
—R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa1
If people do not believe that mathematics is simple, it is only because they
do not realize how complicated life is.
—John von Neumann2

A

fter five hundred years of bloodshed, mistrust, and mutual antagonism between two nations, a Nephite prince follows his inner
voice and goes to preach to his historical enemies, the Lamanites. On
arrival, Lamanites straightaway seize the prince and arraign him before
the local king. The fate of the Nephite prince lies in the hands of the
enemy king, who has utter discretion and power to execute, detain,
imprison, or deport him. In what appears to be an act of cruel whimsy,
the king asks his captive whether he intends to stay and live among the
Lamanites. The Nephite responds emphatically that he intends to dwell
among Lamanites until his dying day. Responding to this affirmation,

1. R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions: Introduction
and Critical Survey (1957; repr., New York: Dover, 1989), 1.
2. The source of this semiapocryphal quote is set out at http://www.math
.uiowa.edu/~jorgen/vonneumannquotesource.html.
BYU Studies Quarterly 52, no. 2 (13)
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the king unshackles the prince and offers to make him part of his family, and from this point forward Nephite-Lamanite interaction changes
profoundly.
What could explain this exchange? Ammon, the prince, has not yet
opened his mouth to preach, yet something in the nature of his contact
with the king reverses deep-rooted suspicion and gives rise to cooperation. While arguably the Book of Mormon’s most important case of
conflict resolution, the Ammon example is merely one of many interactions in the Book of Mormon that, on closer inspection, demand further
thought and scrutiny.
The Book of Mormon brims with conflict from its earliest to its latest
pages, and each struggle poses its own questions. When Laman, Lemuel,
Sam, and Nephi approach Laban to get the brass plates, could they more
effectively anticipate Laban’s reaction and work to counteract it? Why
does sibling rivalry and discontent in Lehi’s family repeat itself in similar ways and ultimately spiral down into ongoing violence? How is it
possible for Nephite authors such as Enos and others to express concern
for Lamanite welfare and simultaneously pursue war against Lamanites,
condemning them as wild, bloodthirsty, idolatrous, and filthy (Enos
1:20)? Why does war disappear for almost three centuries after Jesus’s
postresurrection appearance? Why does the Book of Mormon end in
apocalyptic ruin rather than peace?
Because the Book of Mormon is holy writ (many principal characters proclaim themselves to be—or are viewed by later authors as—
prophets of God), a believer will naturally view such questions through
the lens of faith. The answer of a believer to many of these questions says
that character X is devoted and obedient to God’s will in a given conflict
and is thus divinely prospered, whereas character Y is prideful in defying God and suffers ill effects as a result. Observations like these find
intrinsic support within the Book of Mormon and its Judeo-Christian
belief system, but failure to inquire further may deprive readers of crucial insights and patterns that are hidden in plain view.
A comparative study of game theory and the Book of Mormon provides such insights. Some comparative studies make more intuitive sense
than others. Almost forty-five years have passed since a twenty-threeyear-old student published groundbreaking work that revealed the existence and extent of chiastic patterns in the Book of Mormon, joining
centuries-old knowledge of poetic forms in the Bible with then-nascent
Book of Mormon studies. The ongoing enthusiasm of academics and
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lay observers for the chiasmus study flows partly from a feeling that
the Book of Mormon should, given its origin, evidence ancient Hebrew
poetic forms.3
Many later studies uniting various disciplines with close analysis of
the Book of Mormon evoke similar responses of accord and praise. For
example, the record’s descriptions of lands, seas, and general topography give a natural entrée to geographic studies.4 Other topical suitors include ancient history,5 American history,6 modern literature,7
geology,8 semiotics,9 and law.10 Despite this diversity, no student of the
Book of Mormon has ever rigorously applied game theory to its histories and social structures.
The architects of game theory sought to provide a mathematical, axiomatic base for economics, and by this measure the discipline admittedly fails to present itself as a natural scriptural bedfellow.11 From its
earliest days, however, game theory has set about to measure, map,
and try to resolve conflicts of interest, identifying optimal outcomes
3. John W. Welch, “Chiasmus in the Book of Mormon,” BYU Studies 10,
no. 1 (1969): 69; see also, for example, Joseph M. Spencer, An Other Testament:
On Typology (Salem, Ore.: Salt Press, 2012), 2–7.
4. See, for example, David Palmer, review of Exploring the Lands of the
Book of Mormon, by Joseph L. Allen, BYU Studies 30, no. 3 (1990): 136.
5. See Terryl L. Givens, By the Hand of Mormon: The American Scripture
That Launched a New World Religion (New York: Oxford University Press,
2002), 89–116; C. Wilfred Griggs, “The Book of Mormon as an Ancient Book,”
BYU Studies 22, no. 3 (1982): 259–78.
6. See Richard L. Bushman, “The Book of Mormon and the American
Revolution,” BYU Studies 17, no. 1 (1976): 3–20.
7. See Gordon K. Thomas, “The Book of Mormon in the English Literary
Context of 1837,” BYU Studies 27, no. 1 (1987): 37–45; Richard H. Cracroft, “The
Gentle Blasphemer: Mark Twain, Holy Scripture, and the Book of Mormon,”
BYU Studies 11, no. 2 (1971): 119–40.
8. See Benjamin R. Jordan, “‘Many Great and Notable Cities Were Sunk’:
Liquefaction in the Book of Mormon,” BYU Studies 38, no. 3 (1999): 119–22.
9. See Steven L. Olsen, “Cosmic Urban Symbolism in the Book of Mormon,” BYU Studies 23, no. 1 (1983): 79–92.
10. See John W. Welch, The Legal Cases in the Book of Mormon (Provo, Utah:
Neal A. Maxwell Institute, 2008).
11. John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 60th anniv. ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
2007), 1–15.
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where struggles arise between individuals and groups. Recognizing the
power of game theory as an analytical tool, modern jurists, politicians,
lawyers,12 sociologists,13 Bible scholars,14 and others continually work
to grasp and apply its principles in their fields. This article represents the
first sustained effort to do so in the Book of Mormon.
In their influential 1957 treatise on game theory, Duncan Luce and
Howard Raiffa explain: “Game theory is not descriptive, but rather (conditionally) normative. It states neither how people do behave nor how
they should behave in an absolute sense, but how they should behave
if they wish to achieve certain ends.”15 During the 1930s and 1940s,
luminaries of twentieth-century mathematics (most notably John von
Neumann and John Nash) developed game theory’s bedrock principles
and assumptions. A vital example of these principles is John Nash’s
“equilibrium point.” Nash shows that the best choice in many conflicts
is the choice that cannot be bested regardless of the approach taken by
one’s opponent (more on this later). Though central to game-theory
decision making, Nash’s equilibrium point is called into question by a
simple game/conflict called the “Prisoner’s Dilemma.”
The Prisoner’s Dilemma has its origin in research by game theorists Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher (and takes its name from a
story about two prisoners that was created to explain the research to
lay audiences).16 Initially aiming to validate Nash’s work in a practical
trial, Flood and Dresher demonstrate that individuals might choose
a mutually beneficial outcome even though it carries more risk than
an equilibrium point approach. Hailed as the foundation of “many of
the best-developed models of important political, social and economic
processes,”17 the Prisoner’s Dilemma has grown over time to be seen
as game theory’s most persistent call to reflection on the pursuit and

12. See Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner, and Randal C. Picker, Game
Theory and the Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994).
13. See Luce and Raiffa, Games and Decisions.
14. See Steven J. Brams, Biblical Games: Game Theory and the Hebrew Bible,
rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002).
15. Luce and Raiffa, Games and Decisions, 63.
16. Merrill M. Flood, “Some Experimental Games,” U.S. Air Force Project
RAND Research Memorandum RM-789-1 (June 20, 1952). For a brief explanation of the origin of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, see note 31 herein.
17. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (London: Penguin, 1990),
28–29.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol52/iss2/6
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possibility of cooperation where conflicts arise. This call finds particular
expression in the Book of Mormon.
The thesis of the present work is threefold: first, the Book of Mormon
can be read as an extended, iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, with its unique
histories reflecting outcomes that are consistent with modern game
theory; second, reading the Book of Mormon in light of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma brings the text’s patterns of conflict into sharp relief and provides a useful framework for understanding those patterns; and, last, a
close reading of the Book of Mormon yields insights into the Prisoner’s
Dilemma that reaffirm a pattern not generally evident in studies of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma but which can be seen in the initial experiment carried out by Flood and Dresher.
An Introduction to Game Theory
and the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Although the primary aim of this article is to explore how the Prisoner’s
Dilemma can (and should) inform study of the Book of Mormon, the
Prisoner’s Dilemma must first be understood in relation to certain foundational principles of game theory. To this end, the introductory section
of this article will briefly lay out principles established by von Neumann
and Nash. Having laid this foundation, it will then explain what the Prisoner’s Dilemma is and how it has developed conceptually. The main portion of the article will then discuss how the Prisoner’s Dilemma relates to
the Book of Mormon.
Von Neumann, Zero-Sum Games, and the Minimax Principle
Princeton-based Hungarian mathematician John von Neumann worked
out game theory’s threshold and starting point, which constitutes his
best-known contribution to the field: the minimax principle. Von
Neumann developed the minimax principle in what he referred to as
“zero-sum two-person games.”18 “Game” in this context means a conflict
between two individuals or groups over a finite resource or reward. The
label “zero-sum” comes from the condition that the sum of all outcomes
in the conflict must equal zero; in other words, one person’s gain is the
other person’s loss, and neither “player” can gain more by adding to
the limited resource that is the subject of the conflict (another term for
“zero-sum” in game-theory parlance is “strictly competitive”).
18. Von Neumann and Morgenstern, Theory of Games, 48.
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2016
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Attempts to explain zero-sum games sometimes involve children
and a cake.19 Two children have a cake that they are to divide and consume, and the entire cake can be assigned a value of 1. Any portion of
the cake that one child can secure for itself (creating positive value for
that child) will come at the expense of the other child. Suppose that
child 1 secures a portion equal to 0.6, meaning that 0.4 goes to child 2.
The 0.4 to child 2 creates a value of –0.4 for child 1, giving child 1 a net
gain of 0.2. The opposite will be true for child 2, who receives a positive
value of 0.4 but a lost value of 0.6, leaving child 2 with an overall position of –0.2. While child 1 wins this conflict, the overall gains and losses
of both children amount to zero.
But more is needed. In a zero-sum conflict, each player makes a
choice that is independent of the other player and that must be made
without knowledge of how the other player will exercise her choice
(the game is, in other words, what game theorists would refer to as
“noncooperative”).20 In making choices, each player seeks to achieve two
aims: (1) increase as much as possible the amount gained from the conflict and (2) guard as much as possible against the risk posed by the other
player seeking to do the same.
Von Neumann’s great insight is that the optimal choice for either
player in a zero-sum game is not simply the choice that yields the possibility of greatest gain. Instead, the minimax principle prescribes a course
of action that combines the qualities of increasing as much as possible
the minimum amount one player receives (maximize the minimum, or
maximin) and decreasing as much as possible the top amount accruing
to the other player (minimize the maximum, or minimax).21 Applying
this to the cake example, if one child cuts the cake and the other has
first choice of the pieces then the cutter will cut the cake directly down
the middle. This both minimizes the maximum that the other child will
receive (no more than half) while maximizing the minimum amount
that she will receive (half).
19. See William Poundstone, Prisoner’s Dilemma: John von Neumann, Game
Theory, and the Puzzle of the Bomb (New York: Anchor, 1993), 52–55; Katie Salen
and Eric Zimmerman, Rules of Play: Game Design Fundamentals (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 2004), 239–41; Steven J. Brams, Michael A. Jones, and Christian Klamler, “Better Ways to Cut a Cake,” Notices of the American Mathematical Society 53, no. 11 (December 2006), 1314–21. Other well-known examples of
zero-sum games include tic-tac-toe, checkers, and chess.
20. See Luce and Raiffa, Games and Decisions, 88–89.
21. See von Neumann and Morgenstern, Theory of Games, 153–54.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol52/iss2/6
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Von Neumann called the optimal solution to such a game its “saddle
point.”22 A saddle point can be simply understood as the point at which
the interests of each individual in a zero-sum conflict are optimally balanced—the confluence of minimax and maximin in a way analogous to
a mountain saddle pass that joins two opposing peaks.23 In formulating theorems and identifying saddle points, von Neumann backed up
his reasoning with rigorous mathematical proofs that go far beyond
the scope of the present article. The vital point here is that the minimax principle elegantly illustrates the type of question that game theory
seeks to address: where the interests of individuals or groups diverge,
under what conditions can those interests find a mutual balance point?
Nash, Non-Zero-Sum Games, and Equilibrium Points
Someone who has grasped the minimax principle or notion of a saddle
point already understands to a notable degree the intuition behind John
Nash’s “equilibrium point.” However, where the minimax principle applies
solely in the context of strictly competitive games, equilibrium points can
be located in games where outcomes do not sum to zero.24 Nash formulates the notion of equilibrium points explicitly to find a principle of more
general applicability,25 and a basic understanding of equilibrium points is
key for anyone who wishes to grasp the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
22. Von Neumann and Morgenstern, Theory of Games, 93–95.
23. Von Neumann and Morgenstern, Theory of Games, 95.
24. The remaining discussion in this article revolves around games that are
competitive but not strictly competitive (not zero-sum). As discussed further
in the context of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, this means that while the interests of
the players conflict, they do not conflict in all instances. In a competitive game,
there may exist one or more outcomes that the players jointly prefer above all
others despite conflict on other outcomes. In thinking about the distinction
between competitive and strictly competitive conflicts, we should take care not
to conflate the question of whether a game is competitive with whether it is
cooperative. The former deals with the question of whether (and to what extent)
the interests of the parties conflict, whereas the latter deals with the question
of whether the parties can communicate before making their decisions (that
is, whether they can collaborate in order to reach a given outcome). While this
article has discussed both strictly and “merely” competitive games, all of the
games discussed in this article (including the Prisoner’s Dilemma) are non
cooperative. For further discussion on strictly competitive vs. nonstrictly competitive games, see, for example, Luce and Raiffa, Games and Decisions, 59–60.
25. Howard W. Kuhn and Sylvia Nasar, eds., The Essential John Nash (Prince
ton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), 49–50, 85–86.
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2016
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To understand the nature of an equilibrium point, consider two players (A and B) who can decide among the possible choices and related
outcomes in a game that is represented in the table below (as illustrated,
the first outcome in a given cell is for player A and the second outcome is for player B—for example, reading figure 1 below, if both players
deploy choice 2, then A will have an outcome of 3 and B will have an
outcome of 80):26
B
Choice 1
A

Choice 2

Choice 1

7, 4

4, 0

Choice 2

0, 3

3, 80

Figure 1. Player A’s outcome is listed first, then player B’s. The equilibrium point is 7, 4.

The equilibrium point for A and B in this game emerges when both players employ choice 1. Choice 1 represents an equilibrium point for both
parties because neither party can expect to benefit by employing any other
choice.27 If A employs choice 1, the best possible outcome will be 7 and
the minimum outcome will be 4. Likewise, if B employs choice 1, the
best outcome is 4 and the worst outcome is 3. While B could potentially
achieve an outcome of 80 by employing choice 2, B cannot expect to
benefit by employing this strategy because A cannot justify choice 2 and
will not choose it given the relative outcomes under choice 1.28
Where von Neumann’s saddle point was the point at which minimax
and maximin interests find optimal balance (an outcome that Nash
called the “basic ingredient” of his equilibrium point theory),29 Nash’s
equilibrium point can be understood as a similar but more general result
where “each player’s strategy is optimal against those of the others.”30 In
other words, a player in a game reaches the equilibrium point when she
happens upon a choice that cannot be bested when taking into account
all strategies that the other player (or players) could employ.
Due to this article’s focus on the Prisoner’s Dilemma and given the
intricacy of Nash’s proofs, this article does not further consider the detail or
nature of the games that Nash explored. Nash’s core insight of equilibrium
26. See Poundstone, Prisoner’s Dilemma, 98; see also Luce and Raiffa, Games
and Decisions, 170–72.
27. See Luce and Raiffa, Games and Decisions, 170–72.
28. See Poundstone, Prisoner’s Dilemma, 98.
29. Kuhn and Nasar, Essential John Nash, 85.
30. Kuhn and Nasar, Essential John Nash, 87.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol52/iss2/6
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point must be understood at a general level, however, because its application is what makes the Prisoner’s Dilemma a true dilemma.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma
(from the Flood-Dresher Experiment to the Axelrod Tournaments)
Like the example of children and cake and the encounter between A and
B in figure 1, the Prisoner’s Dilemma is a game—a conflict where players’ relative choices determine their received outcomes. Merrill Flood
and Melvin Dresher conceived and carried out the original Prisoner’s
Dilemma study (titled the “Non-Cooperative Pair”) in or around January
1950, publishing it in 1952.31 In the years following Flood and Dresher’s
experiment, the Prisoner’s Dilemma became a subject of intense debate
and analysis both within the game-theory community and far beyond.32
31. Flood, “Some Experimental Games,” 17. The Flood-Dresher study took
its moniker soon thereafter from a simple story involving two prisoners that
Albert William Tucker (a Princeton mathematician and acquaintance of Flood
and Dresher) produced to make the research accessible for audiences with little
or no background in game theory. Poundstone, Prisoner’s Dilemma, 116–18; Luce
and Raiffa, Games and Decisions, 94–95. Tucker, who was a colleague of von Neumann and had taught John Nash, told a story to illustrate the Prisoner’s Dilemma
that went something like the following (here as related by Luce and Raiffa):
“Two suspects are taken into custody and separated. The district attorney is
certain that they are guilty of a specific crime, but he does not have adequate evidence to convict them at a trial. He points out to each prisoner that each has two
alternatives: to confess to the crime the police are sure they have done or not to
confess. If they both do not confess, then the district attorney states he will book
them on some very minor trumped-up charge such as petty larceny and illegal
possession of a weapon, and they will both receive minor punishment; if they
both confess they will be prosecuted, but he will recommend less than the most
severe sentence; but if one confesses and the other does not, then the confessor
will receive lenient treatment for turning state’s evidence whereas the latter will
get ‘the book’ slapped at him.” Luce and Raiffa, Games and Decisions, 95.
If illustrated in a table, the game would appear as follows:
Suspect 2

Suspect 1

Not Confess

Confess

Not Confess

1 year, 1 year

10 years, 3 months

Confess

3 months, 10 years

8 years, 8 years

Why, precisely, this game poses a dilemma and the nature of its implications are further explored in the body of this article.
32. See, for example, Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, 28. Axelrod mentions Prisoner’s Dilemma studies in relation to a variety of specific and abstract
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2016
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Among the various debaters and students, Robert Axelrod (a mathematician and political scientist at the University of Michigan) published a
pivotal subsequent study in 1984, The Evolution of Cooperation.
Axelrod boils down the Prisoner’s Dilemma into the following tidy
narrative:
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, there are two players. Each has two
choices, namely cooperate or defect. Each must make the choice without knowing what the other will do. No matter what the other does,
defection yields a higher payoff than cooperation. The dilemma is that
if both defect, both do worse than if both had cooperated. . . . The
Prisoner’s Dilemma is simply an abstract formulation of some very
common and very interesting situations in which what is best for each
person individually leads to mutual defection, whereas everyone would
have been better off with mutual cooperation.33

Axelrod summarizes the game’s payoffs as follows:34
B
Cooperate
A

Defect

Cooperate

3, 3

0, 5

Defect

5, 0

1, 1

Figure 2. Player A’s outcome is listed first, then player B’s. The equilibrium point is 1, 1.

Looking at figure 2, someone schooled in game theory should immediately note that the game is not strictly competitive, since the outcomes
for the players do not all sum to zero (for example, it is possible for both
players to come out ahead if both players cooperate). Dealing with a
non-zero-sum game and unable, therefore, to apply the minimax principle, we must ask where the equilibrium point lies.
The clear equilibrium point is, as Axelrod hints, mutual defection;
stated another way, neither player can expect to do any better in a noncooperative environment than to defect. Although both players will perform better if they cooperate, each player faces the constant temptation
to defect, scoring additional value and leaving the cooperator with a loss.
Because cooperation opens up to each player the greatest possibility of
loss, the only strategy that cannot be bested independent of any decision
made by the other player is to defect. And therein lies the dilemma: the
fields including the arms race, “oligopolistic competition,” vote trading, women’s rights, collective action, rational thought, and others.
33. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, 8, 9.
34. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, 8.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol52/iss2/6
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most efficient result comes when both players choose an option that,
while relatively safe, yields less overall utility (2) than if the players were
to both take a choice that creates greater overall good both individually
and collectively (6 when both cooperate).35
As part of his Prisoner’s Dilemma analysis, Axelrod introduces
nicknames for the payoffs (allowing him to avoid constant reference to
numerical values). The payoff to each player for mutual cooperation is
the “reward,” or R. Where one player cooperates and the other defects, the
defector gains the “temptation” (T) while the cooperator is left with the
“sucker’s payoff ” (S). Where both defect, both players receive the “punishment” (P):36
B

A

Cooperate

Defect

Cooperate

R, R

S, T

Defect

T, S

P, P

Figure 3. Player A’s outcome is listed first, then player B’s. The equilibrium point is P, P.

Generalizing in this way, Axelrod injects a further dose of mathematical
rigor in establishing two conditions that must be met in order for payoffs to qualify as a Prisoner’s Dilemma:37
35. A rational observer would comment that the value of the 1.5 cents should
be discounted to take account of the risk of the other player choosing choice 2
and subjecting the player to loss.
36. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, 8–9, 206–7.
37. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, 9–10, 206–7. The Axelrod version
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma meets both of these conditions: condition 1 is met
because 5 > 3 > 1 > 0, and condition 2 is met because, once the calculation has
been made, 3 > 2.5. While these conditions provide a handy guide in relation
to Axelrod’s version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (which one could call a “symmetric Prisoner’s Dilemma,” given the equal payoffs to both parties), they do
not adequately describe the conditions that would have to exist for a Prisoner’s
Dilemma of the type described in the Flood-Dresher experiment (an “asymmetric Prisoner’s Dilemma”). For an asymmetric Prisoner’s Dilemma, the conditions would have to be revised slightly as follows:
Condition 1*: (T1 + T2) > (R1 + R2) > (P1 + P2) > (S1 + S2)
(R1 + R2) > (T1 + S1) + (T2 + S2)
2
4
It should be noted here that while the Flood-Dresher experiment (explored
later in the article) meets condition 1 (after sums are performed, 5 > 1.5 > 0.5
> –2), it does not meet condition 2 (having done the math, 0.25 = 0.25; this fails
Condition 2*:

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2016
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Condition 1: T (temptation payoff) > R (reward payoff) > P (punishment payoff) > S (sucker’s payoff)
(T + S)

Condition 2: R > 2
The first condition is essential because even in circumstances where
it is hard (or practically impossible) to attach cardinal values to payoffs,
we can still apply an ordinal hierarchy to assess payoffs relative to one
another and have certainty that the players are receiving incentives that
match the Prisoner’s Dilemma model. The second condition speaks
less to the relative value between payoffs and more to the power of the
proposed reward (R) relative to the temptation (T) and the sucker’s
payoff (S). If R does not have greater value than the average of T and S,
then this could suggest that a player does not have strong enough incentive to seek R because T could invariably yield higher returns (even if
only obtained sometimes).38 These generalized terms combined with
the conditions make the Prisoner’s Dilemma more flexible and easy to
apply in a wide variety of situations while still retaining consistency.
Two primary questions drive Axelrod’s analysis of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma: (1) “In situations where each individual has an incentive to be
selfish, how can cooperation ever develop . . . without the aid of a central authority?”39 and (2) “Since the Prisoner’s Dilemma is so common
in everything from personal relations to international relations,” what
because the former should be greater than the latter as in the Axelrod experiment). While the Flood-Dresher experiment presents the first instance of a Prisoner’s Dilemma (a game where the optimal outcome yields less overall gain
than an outcome where both players spontaneously cooperate), we might argue
that the failure of the reward (R) to outweigh the average of the temptation and
the sucker’s payoff ([T + S]/2) creates a more powerful incentive for the players to defect (noting that AA defects on almost 1⁄5 of his plays, and AA and JW
together defect on just over ¼ of the 100 plays). Where symmetric and asymmetric payoffs are concerned, Axelrod does admit that the payoffs do not need
to be symmetric provided that the two conditions are met. Axelrod, Evolution of
Cooperation, 17. However, for the conditions to apply to asymmetric payoffs, they
must be amended in the same manner as condition 1* and condition 2* above.
38. Axelrod writes in relation to the second condition: “The second part of
the definition of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is that the players cannot get out of their
dilemma by taking turns exploiting each other. This assumption means that an
even chance of exploitation and being exploited is not as good an outcome for a
player as mutual cooperation. It is therefore assumed that the reward for mutual
cooperation is greater than the average of the temptation and the sucker’s payoff.”
Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, 10.
39. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, 3, 6.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol52/iss2/6
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practical strategy can an individual apply to “choose effectively in an
iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma”?40
To test these questions, Axelrod organized and ran two Prisoner’s
Dilemma computer tournaments. He invited experienced game theorists
to submit computer programs with encoded rules on whether to cooperate or defect on every move of an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.41 Fourteen academics from five disciplines (psychology, economics, political
science, mathematics, and sociology) responded in the first tournament,
and, following that tournament’s success, sixty-two academics participated in the second tournament. Each tournament was structured as a
round robin with 200 moves per round (making 400 separate choices
per round for both players).42 Each move was awarded points in accordance with figure 2 above, and to win the tournament a program would
have to score the highest average number of points across all rounds.
The winner of both tournaments was a very simple program named
TIT FOR TAT (“TFT”).43 The strategy encoded into TFT starts with a
cooperative move and then does whatever the other player did on the
prior move.44 As long as the other player is willing to cooperate, TFT
cooperates. The instant that a player defects, TFT follows suit. Axelrod
calls TFT and strategies like it “nice” strategies, by which he means that
they are never the first to defect.45 The results of both tournaments show
that TFT’s strength derives from a combination of four characteristics: it
is (1) nice (never defects first), (2) retaliatory/provokable (quickly reacts
to defection), (3) forgiving (holds no grudges in relation to past defection and promptly cooperates along with the other party) and (4) clear
(very easy to recognize in iterated play).46
A number of conclusions that Axelrod derives from the tournament
results will be teased out as we apply the Prisoner’s Dilemma to the Book
of Mormon, but one key conclusion must be mentioned here: the propensity of individuals to cooperate depends on their scope for future
40. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, 27, 29.
41. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, 30–31. Axelrod mentions that he
specifically invited individuals with a “rich understanding of the strategic possibilities inherent in a non-zero-sum setting . . . who had published articles on
game theory in general or the Prisoner’s Dilemma in particular.”
42. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, 30–31.
43. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, 31–32.
44. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, 31.
45. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, 33.
46. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, 54.
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interaction (something that he refers to as the “shadow of the future”).47
Axelrod successfully demonstrates that TFT succeeds only if the value
assigned to future interaction is high.48 The lower the value that players attach to future dealing (perhaps, as Axelrod points out, owing to a
“greater likelihood that the interaction will end soon, or to a greater preference for immediate benefits over delayed gratification”),49 the more likely
it becomes that players will defect and the poorer the results obtained by
TFT. And the reverse is also true: as the shadow of the future lengthens,
players become more prone to cooperate and the results obtained by TFT
are more robust.
We are almost equipped to apply the Prisoner’s Dilemma, but there
remains a variation of the game that yields results that must be understood before starting a Book of Mormon analysis: the asymmetric Prisoner’s Dilemma. The Prisoner’s Dilemma as described by Axelrod is
symmetric; in other words, the players receive equivalent payoffs in
similar situations (T, R, P and S are the same for each player). Axelrod
accepts that this equivalence is not necessary for a Prisoner’s Dilemma
to be considered as such (the important thing is for the two conditions
described above to be met).50 While taking this vital logical step, Axelrod does not explore how players might react if their payoffs are not
equivalent.
Nonequivalent, asymmetric payoffs matter because they naturally
occur in many (if not most) “real-life” situations, and the original
Flood study gives us a compelling case in point. To carry out his “Non-
Cooperative Pair” experiment, Flood chose Armen Alchian (AA) of
UCLA and John Williams (JW) of RAND (both of whom were “familiar
with two-person zero-sum game theory”).51 Flood presented AA and
JW with the payoffs in figure 4 below, explaining that they would repeat
the game 100 times and have an opportunity to record thoughts or reactions after each play:

47. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, 59, 124–32.
48. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, 126–32.
49. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, 128.
50. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, 17.
51. Flood, “Some Experimental Games,” 17; see also Poundstone, Prisoner’s
Dilemma, 106. Flood noted more specifically, “They also knew something of
the von Neumann–Morgenstern theory for non-constant sum games, but were
not familiar either with the Nash work or the split-the-difference principle.”
Flood, “Some Experimental Games,” 17.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol52/iss2/6
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JW

AA

Choice 1

Choice 2

Choice 1

0.5¢, 1¢

–1¢, 2¢

Choice 2

1¢, –1¢

0, 0.5¢

Figure 4. AA’s outcome is listed first, then JW’s. The equilibrium point is 0, 0.5¢.

Unlike the Axelrod tournaments, the Flood study has each player receive
different payments in the same situations. The payoffs conform to the
T > R > P > S hierarchy, but they are not equal.
Flood ran the mini-tournament and then tallied up the results of
the 100 games played between AA and JW. We can see that the AA-JW
contest yields the following frequencies:52
JW
Choice 1
AA

Choice 2

Choice 1

60%

8%

Choice 2

18%

14%

Figure 5.

In a study designed to test whether players would choose the Nash equilibrium in practice, the players do not generally choose the most efficient
outcome.53 The 60 percent frequency of mutual cooperation vindicates
the “shadow of the future” conclusion of the Axelrod tournaments over
thirty years before those tournaments ever took place. In repeated play
over 100 iterations, the players’ scope for future interaction gives them
incentive to do the risky thing and cooperate, steering away from the
equilibrium point. Bolstering this “shadow of the future” analysis, AA
even identifies explicitly that the end of the game could likely trigger

52. Flood, “Some Experimental Games,” 18.
53. Flood, “Some Experimental Games,” 1–4. Flood stated specifically:
“I have long felt that the axiomatic structures developed by von NeumannMorgenstern, and by others, should be tested for applicability and usefulness
in controlled experimental situations—and I have called such activity ‘experimental games’” (at 3). Flood and Dresher both worked for the RAND Corporation (RAND stood for “research and development”), a project set up initially
as a joint venture between Douglas Aircraft and the U.S. Air Force to conduct
military research. Poundstone, Prisoner’s Dilemma, 84–86. Though in the years
immediately following World War II RAND researchers concentrated mainly
on the logistics and practical repercussions of nuclear war, their research
broadened as the years progressed. Poundstone, Prisoner’s Dilemma, 84–99.
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defection by both parties. As the end of the game approaches and the
players hit a stretch of prolonged cooperation, AA comments after move
91 of 100 (both parties having cooperated on the prior 9 moves): “When
will [JW] switch as a last minute grab of (2) [defection]. Can I beat him
to it as late as possible?”54 AA knows that the end of the game will flip
the players’ incentives, giving them reason to value larger short-term
gain over the steady long-term gains of cooperation.
In addition to the “shadow of the future,” another trend jumps out
of the Flood tournament: almost 1⁄5 of the game’s outcomes consist of
JW choosing 1 while AA defects and picks choice 2. Why does AA take
advantage of JW, and why does he do it to JW 10 percent more often
than JW does it to him?
Figure 4 plainly shows inequality in the results received by AA and
JW; whatever AA might achieve, JW will achieve more in the same circumstances. While choice 2 is the optimal, safest bet, it leaves JW with
very little and AA with nothing when both choose it together (although
it does have the virtue of protecting both players from receiving –1¢ in a
scenario where one or the other player defects). Given the game’s setup,
the only way that AA can get a decent result is to defect by choosing 2
when JW chooses 1. So mere observation of the payoffs suggests that
AA might defect more often simply to increase his score; however, the
players’ notes give this story more color and shed light on two distinctly
varying narratives about the game’s progression.
JW recognizes early in the process that choice 2 is the game’s equilibrium point, but that both players will do better if they are willing to
assist one another in mutually choosing 1.55 It is obvious to JW that he
will personally gain more than AA from both cooperation and equilibrium point scenarios, but JW’s thought is that cooperation under
choice 1 yields greater good to both of them so AA may as well “get
on the bandwagon . . . [and] invest in his own future.”56 In short, JW
54. Flood, “Some Experimental Games,” 40.
55. Flood, “Some Experimental Games,” 41. JW’s exact thoughts (recorded
after play number 10) were as follows (he was apparently thinking in terms
of 10-play intervals): “I can guarantee myself a gain of 5, and guarantee that
Player AA breaks even (at best). On the other hand, with nominal assistance
from AA, I can transfer the guarantee of 5 to Player AA and make 10 for myself
too. This means I have control of the game to a large extent, so Player AA had
better appreciate this and get on the bandwagon.” Flood, “Some Experimental
Games,” 41.
56. Flood, “Some Experimental Games,” 41.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol52/iss2/6
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accepts the game’s fundamental inequality and feels that both players
should try to achieve as much as possible within their respective privileged and less-privileged spheres.
As AA defects throughout the game, trying to take points at JW’s
expense, JW expresses at turns bemusement and outrage. JW clearly
views himself as a noble benefactor who is trying to do the “virtuous”
thing while AA is jealous of his success, a petulant “stinker” who “learns
slow.”57 JW’s nutshell view of AA is probably best expressed after play 52,
when he notes: “He requires great virtue but doesn’t have it himself.”58
AA also recognizes the outcome inequality, but as the player destined to come up short, he reacts to it differently than JW. Immediately
after the first play, AA implicitly makes clear that, in his view, an equitable outcome can result only if both players achieve equal points (and
he wins only if he has more points than JW).59 As the game progresses
and AA scores fewer points, he sees that JW is trying to encourage the
cooperative 1-1 scenario but that the score can be equalized by pulling
away and occasionally choosing 2 as JW sticks to 1.60
When JW retaliates against AA’s capricious moves by choosing 2
himself, AA protests again and again that JW is unwilling to “share.”61
From AA’s perspective, JW’s winning posture places on him an obligation to allow AA to win some points at his expense. After move 59, AA
records, “He does not want to trick me. He is satisfied. I must teach
him to share.”62 Then, after move 70, “I’ll try once more to share—by
taking.”63 Faced with inequality, AA resorts to self-help to equalize
results—vigilante justice.
And so a dichotomy emerges from the two narratives. For JW, the
players achieve fair outcomes if they both obtain the maximum possible
57. Flood, “Some Experimental Games,” 41–42. JW’s self-epithet (recorded
after play 41) was “always try to be virtuous,” and he saw himself as giving AA
chance after chance to meet him in the virtuous land of choice 1. His impressions of AA were variously: “The stinker,” “He’s crazy,” “Maybe he’ll be a good
boy now,” “To hell with him,” “——, he learns slow!” “The ——,” “A shiftless
individual—opportunist, knave,” and “He can’t stand success.”
58. Flood, “Some Experimental Games,” 42.
59. Flood, “Some Experimental Games,” 39. After play 1, AA recorded: “JW
will play 1—sure win. Hence if I play 1—I lose.”
60. Flood, “Some Experimental Games,” 39.
61. Flood, “Some Experimental Games,” 39. After moves 49, 58 and 67, AA
remarked, “He will not share.”
62. Flood, “Some Experimental Games,” 39, emphasis in original.
63. Flood, “Some Experimental Games,” 40.
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points on a segregated basis. For AA, fairness requires absolute parity,
which, given the setup of the game, requires JW occasionally to give
AA extra points (that is, willingly allow AA to take advantage of his
good will). In short, the better-off player in an asymmetric Prisoner’s
Dilemma is satisfied with the status quo while the player with the short
straw desires actual equivalence and feels justified in taking advantage
of his counterpart to achieve such equivalence (provoking retaliation
from the better-off, for whom the setup works well).
The same trends that we see in the Flood-Dresher experiment and
the Axelrod study permeate the Book of Mormon.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Book of Mormon
Given the (necessarily but unfortunately) long introduction to this
article, we should remind ourselves of its core concerns: first, that the
histories of the Book of Mormon can be read as an iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma; second, that reading the Book of Mormon in light of the Prisoner’s Dilemma will help us not only to understand its conflicts better
but also to build a framework for understanding those conflicts; and,
last, that a close reading of the Book of Mormon can offer us examples
of asymmetric Prisoner’s Dilemmas (that is, those with unequal payoffs
similar to the Flood-Dresher study) and give us insight into the effects
of asymmetry and how it might be addressed.
Approaching Book of Mormon History in
a Prisoner’s Dilemma Framework
Applying the Prisoner’s Dilemma to the Book of Mormon raises vital
questions and issues. Rather than address these points in the abstract, we
will consider a story that arguably presents the first Prisoner’s Dilemma
in the Book of Mormon and use it as an entrée to further investigation.
In chapter 3 of 1 Nephi, we find the prophet Lehi and his family in
the wilderness as recent exiles from Jerusalem. Lehi says to Nephi, his
fourth son, that God has commanded him in a dream that Nephi and
his brothers must backtrack to Jerusalem and obtain a set of scriptures
and genealogy recorded on brass plates from a man named Laban (1 Ne.
3:2–4). Nephi and his brothers return to Jerusalem, where they “cast
lots” on who will have to go and speak to Laban—who, we can surmise
from the lot casting, does not have a reputation as an affable man (1 Ne.
3:9–11). Nephi’s brother Laman comes up short and goes to Laban to ask
for the plates, only to receive a terse, aggressive rebuff (1 Ne. 3:11–14).

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol52/iss2/6
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After an intense debate on whether they should return empty-handed or
try Laban again, the brothers decide to return to “the land of our inheritance” and collect “our gold, and our silver, and our precious things” to
exchange for the plates (1 Ne. 3:15–23). As Nephi and his brothers again
approach Laban to transact with their new wager, we might view the
potential outcomes as follows:
Nephi and Brothers
Cooperate
Cooperate

Laban
Defect

Laban gets “precious
things” (R)
Nephi & brothers get
plates (R)
Laban takes everything (T)
Nephi & brothers get
nothing (S)

Defect
Laban gets nothing (S)
Nephi & brothers take
everything (T)
Laban keeps plates (P)
Nephi & brothers keep
“precious things” (P)

Figure 6.

Nephi and his brothers hope for mutual cooperation, but what they
receive from Laban is the sucker’s payoff while he takes the temptation
payoff (1 Ne. 3:25–26).
To determine whether this describes a formal Prisoner’s Dilemma,
we look to Axelrod’s two conditions. The first condition requires that
T (temptation payoff) > R (reward payoff) > P (punishment payoff) > S
(sucker’s payoff). Because we are not dealing with numerical payoffs, the
measurement becomes more subjective, and we must assess the hierarchy from the perspective of each party (assuming that the conditions are
met, Axelrod notes along these lines that the “payoffs of the players need
not be comparable at all”).64
For both sides to this particular conflict, the temptation payoff consists of both the “precious things” and the plates together, while the
sucker’s payoff is nothing. For Nephi and his brothers, the reward payoff
would be the plates and the punishment payoff would be the status quo
of keeping the family’s inheritance (and not obtaining the plates). The
hierarchy of payoffs as it applies to Nephi and his brothers seems to fall
into the following order:
Obtain plates and keep “precious things” (T) > Obtain plates in exchange
for “precious things” (R) > Keep “precious things” and fail to obtain the
plates (P) > Lose “precious things” and receive nothing (S)
64. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, 17.
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Was T the most desirable option for Nephi and his brothers? Although
seemingly innocuous as an initial step, Laman first seeks the plates from
Laban while offering no cooperative compensation at all. A typical Book
of Mormon reader does not think of Laman in this instance as acting
in bad faith (and the textual evidence seems to indicate that he acts in
good faith), but Laman effectively offers Laban the sucker’s payoff. The
brothers in fact seek T before they seek R. We also know that the brothers seek to give their precious things in exchange for the plates, making
it safe to conclude that R is of greater worth than P, and that S is the least
desirable option. For Nephi and his brothers, the text provides strong
support for the hierarchy of T > R > P > S.
So what were Laban’s preferences? Responding to Laman’s initial
wager with the avowal “thou art a robber, and I will slay thee” (1 Ne.
3:13), Laban makes clear that he is not going to give up the plates easily
and that he is no one’s sucker. Nephi’s narrative also shows that after the
second encounter Laban ends up with both the plates and the family
inheritance, so Laban demonstrably values and goes for the T payoff.
While Laban values T the most and S the least, it is less clear whether he
places greater value on the plates (nominally his “punishment” payoff)
or the “precious things” (his assigned “reward” payoff). Laban’s repeated
snubs of the brothers’ attempts to get the plates indicate that he values
the plates enough to hold onto them.
In regard to the “precious things,” Nephi indicates that “when Laban
saw our property, and that it was exceedingly great, he did lust after it,
insomuch that he thrust us out, and sent his servants to slay us, that he
might obtain our property” (1 Ne. 3:25). While this might indicate that
Laban values the property higher than the plates, we must keep in mind
that the story is being related by the recipient of the sucker’s payoff (at least
initially) and that Laban’s desire for the property in this instance coincides
with his grab for T. The dual facts that the plates contain a genealogical
record and that Laban is their keeper could suggest that they also chronicle
his family history and have idiosyncratic worth for him as well.
Thus, while Laban’s hierarchy could follow the prescribed order,
there is some question as to whether this was actually the case:
Obtain plates and keep “precious things” (T) > Obtain “precious things”
in exchange for the plates (R?) ≥ Keep plates and fail to obtain “precious
things” (P?) > Receive and retain nothing (S)65
65. Wynn Stirling helpfully points out that another way of noting the
Laban payoffs could be: “Obtain plates and keep ‘precious things’ (T) >
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol52/iss2/6
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The same Laban caveat holds true for the second Prisoner’s Dilemma
condition:
(T + S)

R> 2
Although Nephi and his brothers value the plates (R) more than the
average payoffs of taking everything (T) and walking away with nothing (S) (especially given that their sole aim in returning to Jerusalem
was to get the plates), the text provides less evidence that Laban values
the brothers’ property more than the average of T and S from his perspective (although one could rationally assume that this was the case).
This exercise illustrates the practical difficulty of applying the Prisoner’s Dilemma to the Book of Mormon. The question as to whether
Laban values the offered riches more than the plates is material because
it goes to the heart of whether Laban has good (or even any) incentive to
cooperate with Nephi and his brothers. While the fit is not perfect, the
story of Nephi and Laban does hew to the Prisoner’s Dilemma model
and it seems fair (noting relevant caveats) to call it a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
If we stipulate that we are dealing here with a robust instance of
a Prisoner’s Dilemma, what does this tell us? This story, after all, is
explicable on a number of common sense levels. Laban is apparently a
ruffian who wants to take property that does not belong to him. Further,
he has already said no, and the brothers have their answer, so perhaps
they should think more carefully about going back to strike a deal with a
man who has a private security force. The Prisoner’s Dilemma, however,
demands that we look at the course of dealing and the scope for future
interaction between these characters.
When we evaluate the Laban story as a Prisoner’s Dilemma, it
becomes clear that that the optimal course of action is mutual defection.
This is where Laman and Laban end up after their first meeting, with
each receiving the P payoff spelled out in figure 6. On this basis alone,
the brothers might have taken a dim view of their chances (and the text
shows that Laman and Lemuel do take a dim view, 1 Ne. 3:14). Further,
Obtain ‘precious things’ in exchange for the plates (R) ~ Keep plates and fail
to obtain ‘precious things’ (P) > Receive and retain nothing (S).” Email, Wynn
Stirling to Robert F. Schwartz, September 15, 2012. The “~” symbol means “is
indifferent between,” reflecting an antisymmetrical relationship. The statement R ~ P formally means R ≥ P and P ≥ R. In this instance, as we are not
certain whether Laban’s preferences were strictly indifferent and the ordinal
preferences as laid out in the text are more easily understood by a lay reader,
the “~” symbol has not been used.
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the brothers and Laban have no scope for future interaction. Laban
likely would have been aware of the family’s hasty departure from Jerusalem, and his repeated death threats indicate that he does not anticipate future dealings with the brothers. With no shadow of the future to
give the parties incentive to prefer delayed gratification over immediate
gain, the man with the army does what is within his power to do.
And so, in this instance, the Prisoner’s Dilemma can indicate ex
ante what, ex post, was clearly destined to transpire when the brothers
approach Laban. Approaching the text from this viewpoint does not
detract from the divine importance of obtaining the plates as described
in 1 Nephi. The brothers (or at least Nephi) recognize that they have
a divine commission, but the lens of the Prisoner’s Dilemma suggests
that they could have, at the very least, gone to Laban with their family
inheritance in the first instance instead of playing Laban for a sucker.
Other strategies might likewise have boosted their chances (one of
which Nephi is compelled to employ later). In any case, the Prisoner’s
Dilemma makes a prominent appearance in the earliest pages of the
Book of Mormon.
Having applied the Prisoner’s Dilemma to the encounter between
Laban and Lehi’s sons, we see that comparative study of the Book of
Mormon and the Prisoner’s Dilemma raises two fundamental challenges,
each of which contains a multitude of questions and considerations:
First challenge. Assigning relative values to payoffs is difficult. Nephi
desires the plates because he is deeply convinced that God has commanded him to retrieve them (see 1 Ne. 3:14–21). Laman and Lemuel,
by contrast, lack apparent conviction and investment in obtaining the
plates (see 1 Ne. 3:5, 14). As discussed above, the text does not fully
resolve the question of whether Laban places greater value on the plates
or the gold and silver. Does it matter that Laban would receive an R consisting of “gold and silver” whereas Nephi would receive R in the form of
a brass-plate chronicle? What if Nephi derives more value from R than
Laban? How does the brothers’ status as sons of Lehi, a wanted criminal,
change Laban’s persuasion?66 Do Laban’s own legal duties (in respect of
the plates or otherwise) impact relative payoffs values?
66. Hugh Nibley, An Approach to the Book of Mormon, 3d ed. (Salt Lake City:
Deseret Book, 1998); the relevant passage discussing Lehi’s public order crimes
in Jerusalem can be accessed at http://maxwellinstitute.byu.edu/publications/
books/?bookid=60&chapid=612. In chapter 28 (“The Way of the Wicked”) of
An Approach to the Book of Mormon, Nibley writes: “The pattern of crime in
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol52/iss2/6
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To line up potential Book of Mormon payoffs and show that they fit
the Axelrod Prisoner’s Dilemma conditions, a reader must scour the
text for evidence that might or might not be forthcoming. Compounding this evidentiary problem is the fact that we receive Book of Mormon
facts from narrators who either live through the events in question or
clearly recognize one or another side as being in the right. So even
where the text reports facts, we have to tread carefully in forming an
“objective” view. And finally, can an action fairly bear the “defection”
label if the text suggests that it effectively fulfills God’s will?
Fortunately, the Prisoner’s Dilemma model (especially as both generalized and formalized by Axelrod) is robust enough both to respond
to and to withstand these concerns while remaining useful as a tool for
measuring conflicts and their outcomes. As noted already, the players’
respective payoffs do not need to match (we should not be worried if we
seem to be comparing apples and oranges).67 As long as the payoffs to a
player can be measured relative to each other, the two definitive conditions can be assessed and measured. The brothers might seek plates and
Laban might seek riches, but as long as we know how the brothers rate
plates relative to family inheritance and that Laban clearly prefers taking everything to accepting the brothers’ offer of “precious things,” then
we can hope to draw conclusions about whether their mutual conflict
proceeds as we would expect, given what the Prisoner’s Dilemma tells
us about human behavior.
Even if we accept that the payoffs to one or another party can qualitatively differ, should the players not be receiving payoffs that have
equivalent value (that is, should they not be quantitatively matched)? Is
it problematic, for instance, that in the mutual cooperation scenario of
figure 6 Nephi seems poised (given his divine mandate) to derive more
the Book of Mormon is clearly established in the very first chapter, where we
read of a plot among the Jews at Jerusalem to put Lehi out of the way. It was
no excited street-rabble or quick impulse of a city mob that threatened his life;
certain parties ‘sought his life’ . . . with purpose and design . . . and his awareness of the danger gave Lehi time to plan and execute an escape. . . . [In the view
of these people,] Lehi was a dangerous and irresponsible troublemaker and, in
view of the international situation, treasonable and subversive to the bargain.”
67. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, 17. Axelrod illustrates this point as
follows: “For example, a journalist might get rewarded with another inside
story, while the cooperating bureaucrat might be rewarded with a chance to
have a policy argument presented in a favorable light.” Axelrod, Evolution of
Cooperation, 17.
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value from the plates than Laban would from the riches (in a way reminiscent of the asymmetric payoffs of the Flood-Dresher experiment)?
Axelrod’s thoughts on this point are important enough that they bear
extended quotation:
The payoffs certainly do not have to be symmetric. It is a convenience
to think of the interaction as exactly equivalent from the perspective of
the two players, but this is not necessary. One does not have to assume,
for example, that the reward for mutual cooperation, or of any of the
other three payoff parameters, have the same magnitude for both players. . . . [One] does not even have to assume that they are measured in
comparable units. The only thing that has to be assumed is that, for
each player, the four payoffs are ordered as required for the definition
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.68

As the original Flood experiment demonstrates, asymmetric payments
can affect the incentives and outcomes of the parties to a Prisoner’s
Dilemma, and we will shortly see how such asymmetry plays out more
generally in Book of Mormon history.
So players can receive different payments, and those payments can
give one player more value (even much more value) than another player,
but should we still hesitate to label an action “defection” that in the Book
of Mormon fulfills (or is responsive to) the will of God? A seed of an
answer to this question is bound up in Axelrod’s thought that “cooperation need not be considered desirable from the point of view of the rest
of the world,” citing bribery as an example.69 The negative pregnant70 of
this statement is the notion that defection is not per se undesirable when
viewed through the lens of a Book of Mormon author. One example
of this appears in figure 6, where the brothers could have obtained the
plates without rendering their possessions to Laban (Laman’s initial
plan), thus simultaneously fulfilling the will of God as expressed by
their father Lehi and defecting vis-à-vis Laban. We will see other examples where a party is said to defect despite acting in furtherance of the
expressed divine will, and this should not be problematic.
68. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, 17. See note 35 for a discussion of the
way in which one would have to modify the conventional Axelrod formulas to
accommodate asymmetric payments.
69. Axelrod, Evolution of Co-operation, 17–18.
70. A negative pregnant is “a denial of an allegation in which a person
actually admits more than he/she denies by denying only a part of the alleged
fact.” The Free Dictionary, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/
Negative+pregnant.
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Second Challenge. Can the core assumption of self-interest/utility
maximization that underpins game theory (including the Prisoner’s
Dilemma) contradict or even undermine the Christian ethos of care
for others that resides at the heart of the Book of Mormon? The answer
here is that self-interest, properly understood, is not mutually exclusive
with reciprocal regard, friendship, or love. Siblings, spouses, and friends
may care for one another deeply, but this does not make the potential
for conflict between them disappear.71 A Book of Mormon prophet may
express profound concern for the welfare of another nation and still
admit or even pursue the possibility of war with that nation (see, for
example, Enos 1:13–14, 20–24, explored in greater detail below). Axelrod précises this issue tidily in explaining that “the assumption of selfinterest is really just an assumption that concern for others does not
completely solve the problem of when to cooperate with them and when
not to.”72 In the Book of Mormon context, we might add that a desire to
fulfill the will of God does not completely solve the problem of when to
cooperate with others and when not to.
In sum, applying the Prisoner’s Dilemma to a study of the Book of
Mormon and its histories could offer unique insights. This effort should
be rigorously controlled by careful fact gathering in the text with an eye
to measure the incentives of an author against the way that he describes
conflicts. Further control comes from applying the conditions that
define the Prisoner’s Dilemma. As these concerns are addressed, a more
interesting question presents itself: if we apply the Prisoner’s Dilemma
to the Book of Mormon, what might we learn?
Patterns of Conflict in the Book of Mormon
Although the Book of Mormon covers in its Nephite histories a millennial
span that includes the rise and fall of large nations, it begins with the story
of one man and his family as they leave their home to travel across deserts
in search of a promised land. The prophet Lehi and his wife, Sariah, have
four sons as the story begins: Laman, Lemuel, Sam, and Nephi (1 Ne. 2:5;
5:1). Although Lemuel and Sam were not mentioned in the Laban discussion above, they were present on the excursion, and so we have had some
introduction to the sons (Jacob and Joseph, two further sons, are born
while Lehi and Sariah live in the desert, as described in 1 Ne. 18:7). Laman

71. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, 6–7.
72. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, 7.
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and Lemuel are known in the Book of Mormon primarily as bad-tempered
foils to Nephi’s righteous character and can-do personality. A recurring
motif throughout 1 Nephi and the opening chapters of 2 Nephi (all written
by Nephi) features Lehi asking his sons to perform some task (such as the
Laban errand) or Nephi encouraging his brothers to take part in a divinely
appointed charge; according to the usual pattern, Nephi earnestly pushes
ahead while his brothers either (1) grudgingly comply or (2) openly rebel
by following their own agenda and, in some instances, inflicting bodily
harm on Nephi when he stands in the way of that agenda.
If we were to count Laman and Lemuel’s complaint-laden compliance as obedience to the relevant request, the potential interactions
within Lehi’s family could be summarized as follows:
Nephi
Cooperate

Laman
and
Lemuel

Cooperate

Defect

Defect

Nephi is obedient (R);
Laman and Lemuel are
obedient (R)

Laman and Lemuel are
obedient (S); Nephi
retaliates (T )

Laman and Lemuel follow
own agenda/beat Nephi
(T ); Nephi is obedient (S)

Laman and Lemuel follow
own agenda/ beat Nephi
(P); Nephi retaliates (P)

Figure 7.

Does this ongoing tension present a Prisoner’s Dilemma? As in the
Nephi-Laban example, the payoffs here are not the same, so we must do
a party-by-party analysis.
For Laman and Lemuel, the record suggests that following their own
agenda (even at the cost of beating Nephi to have the ability to do so)
clearly takes top priority. If Nephi is willing to work while they loaf, that
is ideal. However, their reactions to the rare instances in 1 Nephi where
Nephi (or God) retaliates against them indicate that if they are going to
receive punishment, Laman and Lemuel would rather cooperate than continue to push back (see, for example, 1 Ne. 17:52–55; 18:15, 20). From Laman
and Lemuel’s perspective, therefore, it seems reasonable to argue that:
Following own agenda while Nephi shoulders the hard work (T) > Rendering obedience while Nephi shares the labor (R) > Following own
agenda while suffering Nephi’s (or God’s) ire (P) > Rendering obedience while suffering Nephi’s (or God’s) ire (S)

The second condition also seems colorable, since we could argue
that sharing the labor with Nephi is better from Laman and Lemuel’s
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perspective than the average of T and S. So we seem to have the foundation of a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Nephi’s actions are harder to parse, because his narrative presents
a relentless desire to fulfill God’s will. The T that exerts such pull for
Laman and Lemuel does not seem to attract Nephi at all, which throws
the T > R > P > S hierarchy into question—few readers of the Book of
Mormon can imagine Nephi wanting to lash out at his brothers while
they diligently keep their heads down on the task at hand. While Nephi’s
narrative is replete with occasions where he urges family members to
loyal tractability (1 Ne. 2:16–18; 3:7, 21; 4:1–3; 7:8–12; 16:22; 17:23–47), we
can locate at least one example where Nephi arguably strikes out against
his brothers at a time when they are cooperating.
This instance of Nephi opting for T happens in the famous “shocking” incident that takes place during his shipbuilding. The incident
requires some background: After eight years of desert drifting and hardship, Nephi and his broader family arrive in a land of “much fruit and
also wild honey” situated on a seashore next to “many waters” (1 Ne.
17:5). Nephi records that the weary travelers were “exceedingly rejoiced”
to reach this choice spot (17:6). After some time in this place, Nephi
receives a command from God to build a ship that will take Lehi’s
entire family to a “promised land” (17:7–14). When Nephi encourages
his brothers to join him in shipbuilding, Laman and Lemuel deride
Nephi’s enterprise and refuse to take part (17:15–18). First move: Nephi,
S; Laman and Lemuel, T.
Laman and Lemuel soon notice that their refusal to take part has
deeply upset Nephi, and they take the opportunity to use the perceived
absurdity of Nephi’s shipbuilding to further underscore grievances from
their time in the wilderness dating back to the departure from Jerusalem
(17:19–22). In response, Nephi recounts at length the dealings of God
with Moses and the children of Israel in the wilderness at Sinai, causing
Laman and Lemuel to approach Nephi to “lay their hands upon [him]
. . . to throw [him] into the depths of the sea” (17:23–48). Seeing that his
situation is precarious, Nephi warns his brothers not to touch him, for
he is “filled with the power of God . . . and whoso shall lay his hands
upon me shall wither even as a dried reed . . . for God shall smite him,”
going on to say “many things” to them about God’s power (17:48–52).
Nephi records that after his speech to them, Laman and Lemuel were
“confounded and could not contend against me; neither durst they lay
their hands upon me nor touch me . . . even for the space of many days”
(17:52).
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This second incident is less about building a ship and more about
working out their perceived differences. Although Laman and Lemuel
come close to attacking Nephi, they back down and leave him alone
for the “space of many days” (17:52). Viewing these events together, we
might say that the second move in this particular back-and-forth is:
Nephi, R; Laman and Lemuel, R.
Nephi then receives a command from God: “Stretch forth thine hand
again unto thy brethren, and they shall not wither before thee, but I will
shock them, saith the Lord, and this will I do, that they may know that
I am the Lord their God” (17:53). Despite the fact that Laman and Lemuel pose no imminent threat (having, in Nephi’s words, left him alone
for “many days”) and chose not to attack him previously, Nephi goes
to Laman and Lemuel, lifts his hand to them, and “the Lord did shake
them, even according to the word which he had spoken” (17:54). Third
move: Nephi, T; Laman and Lemuel, S. From this point, Nephi and his
brothers all proceed to build a ship together (1 Ne. 18:1–5) (fourth move:
Nephi, R; Laman and Lemuel, R).
A Book of Mormon reader would not typically class Nephi’s decision
to shock Laman and Lemuel as choosing a temptation payoff (T) (maybe
as encouraging a mutually beneficial outcome, R), but Nephi does inflict
bodily pain on Laman and Lemuel when they had previously chosen not
to go through with an attack on him. Nephi being Nephi, his motivation
for pursuing T is not a “selfish” desire but rather an urge to follow God’s
will and try to promote obedience once and for all. As argued above,
this should not prevent us from applying the T label or recognizing that
Nephi defects vis-à-vis his brothers. To paraphrase Axelrod, Nephi’s
desire to fulfill God’s will does not resolve the issue of when he should
cooperate with Laman and Lemuel and when he should not.
Even so, this one incident does not provide enough evidence to substantiate a claim that Nephi would have preferred T to R. It is clear,
however, that Nephi would have preferred T or R to both P and S, so a
possible hierarchy for Nephi would be: T ≥ R > P > S. While this hierarchy is close (if not perfect), there can be no doubt that Axelrod’s second
condition would be satisfied in Nephi’s case:
(T + S)

R> 2
Although the fit is not impeccable, the Book of Mormon text supplies evidence that the conflicts among Lehi’s sons follow a Prisoner’s
Dilemma format. The level of exegesis in the “shocking” incident is not
possible for each interaction between Nephi and his brothers, but their
course of interaction can be briefly summarized as follows:
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol52/iss2/6

28

Schwartz: Game Theory, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and the Book of Mormon
Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Book of Mormon V

95

Event

Nephi

Laman and Lemuel

First attempt to get the brass plates
(1 Ne. 3:1–13)

Cooperate (R)

Cooperate (R)

Second attempt to get the brass
plates (1 Ne. 3:14–26)

Cooperate (R)

Cooperate (R)

Third attempt to get the brass plates
(1 Ne. 3:27–4:26)

Cooperate (S)

Defect (T)

Return to Jerusalem to get Ishmael
and his family (1 Ne. 7:1–5)

Cooperate (R)

Cooperate (R)

Return to the wilderness from Jerusalem with Ishmael and his family
(initial attempt) (1 Ne. 7:6–16)

Cooperate (S)

Defect (T)

Return to the wilderness from Jerusalem with Ishmael and his family
(subsequent attempt)
(1 Ne. 7:17–22)

Cooperate (R)

Cooperate (R)

Nephi shares insights from his
vision of the tree of life
(1 Ne. 15:21–16:5)

Cooperate (R)

Cooperate (R)

Invitation to build the ship
(1 Ne. 17:8–18)

Cooperate (S)

Defect (T)

Postinvitation back-and-forth
(1 Ne. 17:18–52)

Cooperate (R)

Cooperate (R)

Postinvitation “shock” incident
(1 Ne. 17:53–55)

Defect (T)

Cooperate (S)

Ship building (1 Ne. 18:1–5)

Cooperate (R)

Cooperate (R)

Sailing: merriment and Nephi
bound (1 Ne. 18:9–11)

Cooperate (S)

Defect (T)

Sailing: Nephi bound, Liahona
stops working and storms arise
(1 Ne. 18:12–14)

Defect (P) (note
that here it is God
who “defects,” not
Nephi directly)

Defect (P)

Sailing: Nephi loosed, Liahona
works, storms cease
(1 Ne. 18:15–22)

Cooperate (R) (here
again it is God who
“cooperates,” not
Nephi directly)

Split into two nations upon Lehi’s
death (2 Ne. 5:1–6, 12, 14)

Defect (P) (Nephi
and his people
depart, taking key
parts of Lehi’s
estate)

Cooperate (R)

Defect (P) (Laman
and Lemuel seek to
kill Nephi once and
for all)

Setting out all of the potential conflicts between Nephi and his brothers
in this manner shows that Laman and Lemuel cooperate more often than
they defect (although the selection of incidents is by no means scientific,
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it suggests a 60 percent rate of cooperation that, by coincidence, is a
dead match for the rate of mutual cooperation in the Flood-Dresher
study with AA and JW). While the bellicose pair in fact cooperate often,
they also defect more often than one might expect where the scope for
future interaction between two parties is long. If, as Axelrod suggests,
a long “shadow of the future” should have a positive correlation with
cooperative behavior, why do Laman and Lemuel defect so often?
One explanation for their behavior might be that they are simply
bad and want to get away with whatever they can. In the Axelrod tournament, by way of analogy, one entrant submitted a strategy that Axelrod dubbed “All D” because his rule was to defect without exception.73
Though tempting to view Laman and Lemuel in a similar light, the text
shows them cooperating often during the family’s eight-year desert trek
and subsequent sea voyage and settling in the promised land. More
importantly, the text shows that the brothers have multiple moments of
genuine remorse and desire to improve. After rebelling in the wilderness with Ishmael’s family—seeking to return to Jerusalem—Laman and
Lemuel eventually choose to “bow down before [Nephi] and . . . plead
. . . that [he] would forgive them” (1 Ne. 7:20). When Nephi relates his
vision of the tree of life, Laman and Lemuel “humble themselves before
the Lord,” desiring to do right (16:5). And again, after the “shocking”
incident, Laman and Lemuel bow down to Nephi (17:55). Although their
contrition frequently follows some form of conflict, they show contrition all the same and so the “pure evil” explanation does not wash.
An alternative explanation for Laman and Lemuel’s behavior is that the
benefit they derive from obedience (R) is less than the benefit that Nephi
derives. As in the Flood-Dresher experiment, the Book of Mormon gives
evidence of asymmetric payoffs to the interacting parties. Although all
of Lehi’s sons go to Jerusalem to get the plates (and Laman goes first to
Laban), all sons return for Ishmael and his family, all sons hunt for food,
all sons build the ship, and all sons ultimately suffer eight years of wilderness hardship, the outcomes for all sons are not equal. In a family where a
key part of the father’s profession is to prophesy and preach, Laman and
Lemuel (the eldest) fail to show much aptitude for the family trade while
Nephi (among the youngest) shows huge promise.
When Lehi urges his eldest to be “firm and steadfast . . . in keeping
the commandments of the Lord” during their desert travels, Laman and
Lemuel complain that they cannot understand why it was necessary to
73. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, 63.
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leave Jerusalem in the first place (1 Ne. 2:9–14). When Lehi shares with
all family members his vision of a tree filled with marvelous fruit, he
says that the dream gives him reason to “rejoice . . . because of Nephi
and . . . Sam” but to “fear exceedingly” for Laman and Lemuel (1 Ne. 8:2–
12). Following Lehi’s account, Laman and Lemuel “disput[e] one with
another concerning the things which [Lehi] had spoken” (1 Ne. 15:2).
Besides difficulty in parsing their father’s intentions and proclamations,
Laman and Lemuel fail to bail their family out of a food crisis (1 Ne.
16:15–32), fail to lead in the shipbuilding (1 Ne. 17:17–55), and, according
to the record, precipitate a crisis at sea (1 Ne. 18:8–22).
Nephi, by contrast, receives praise from the beginning as someone
“favored of the Lord” (1 Ne. 3:6, where Nephi reports his father’s words).
It is Nephi who succeeds in obtaining Laban’s plates (1 Ne. 4:6–24),
cracks the spiritual code of his father’s complex dream (1 Ne. 15:6–36),
feeds the family during a time when hunting has become nearly impossible (1 Ne. 16:15–32), and leads the shipbuilding (1 Ne. 17:7–55). Coming
from a culture where the eldest traditionally enjoy priority and unique
blessings (see, for example, Esau and Jacob in Genesis 27), Nephi by his
actions turns tradition on its head and finds more than one occasion to
remind his brothers that he is younger (1 Ne. 7:8, 17:55).
Shortly before his death, Lehi formalizes Nephi’s privileged status,
doing so in a way that leaves Laman and Lemuel in a curious quandary.
Lehi gives Laman, the eldest, “a blessing, yea, even my first blessing,” but
solely on the condition that Laman, Lemuel, and the other brothers and
brothers-in-law must “hearken unto the voice of Nephi” (2 Ne. 1:28).74
If Laman and Lemuel fail to observe the condition, the “first blessing”
reverts to Nephi and stays with him (2 Ne. 1:29). And so even if Laman
obtains his birthright, it is a birthright in name only, subject always to
Nephi’s oversight.
74. The text of 2 Nephi 1:28 reads, “And now my son, Laman, and also Lemuel and Sam, and also my sons who are the sons of Ishmael, behold, if ye will
hearken unto the voice of Nephi ye shall not perish. And if ye will hearken unto
him I leave unto you a blessing, yea, even my first blessing” (italics added). A
close reading shows that Lehi’s primary addressee here is Laman, his eldest.
2 Nephi 4:3 expressly states that Laman is the “firstborn.” As Lehi’s firstborn,
the mentioned “first blessing” would belong to him subject to the condition.
Alongside Laman, Lehi also addresses Lemuel, Sam, and the sons of Ishmael,
urging them all to do the same thing as Laman, namely listen to Nephi. The
sons of Ishmael fall under Lehi’s patriarchal jurisdiction owing to the earlier
death of Ishmael in the wilderness (1 Ne. 16:34).
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Laman and Lemuel are stung by the insult contained in Lehi’s blessing and its condition (2 Ne. 5:3). Adding injury to this insult, Lehi blesses
Laman and Lemuel’s children and successors that they will eventually
find redemption, but not before enduring a “curse” and “destruction”
(2 Ne. 4:3–9). These parting words and Lehi’s death prove to be the
breaking point of the family’s pattern of conflict. Nephi tries to fulfill his
assigned role as the leader of all parties (2 Ne. 4:13–14), but his efforts
lead to an immediate power struggle with Laman and Lemuel, who
soon declare: “Our younger brother thinks to rule over us; and we have
had much trial because of him; wherefore, now let us slay him, that we
may not be afflicted more because of his words. For behold, we will not
have him to be our ruler; for it belongs unto us, who are the elder brethren, to rule over this people” (2 Ne. 5:3). Faced with an ongoing conflict
where Nephi would have the upper hand, Laman and Lemuel seek to
eliminate Nephi altogether.
Laman and Lemuel’s relationship with Nephi calls to mind the
asymmetric Flood-Dresher experiment with AA and JW. In Laman and
Lemuel’s complaint that Nephi “thinks to rule over us; and . . . we will
not have him to be our ruler,” we hear echoes of AA’s frequent protest
that JW “will not share.”75 In Laman and Lemuel’s repeated beatings
of Nephi and their ultimate plan to kill him, we can again hear AA’s
declaration: “I’ll try once more to share—by taking.”76 Frustrated by
perceived or actual inequality in outcomes, AA and Laman and Lemuel
resort to vigilantism (not unlike the self-help to which Joseph’s brothers
resort in Genesis 37, another example of asymmetric outcomes that led
to resentment).
Likewise, Nephi shares JW’s incredulity in dealing with a counterparty who seems intent on scoring points at his expense. Where JW
remarks that AA “isn’t [bright] but maybe he’ll wise up,”77 Nephi comments (more tactfully) that Laman and Lemuel “knew not the dealings
of that God who had created them” and prays that they might come
to know better (1 Ne. 2:12, 18). Where JW expresses constant frustration that AA is a “shiftless individual—opportunist, knave” who “learns
slow,”78 Nephi scolds Laman and Lemuel for being “swift to do iniquity but slow to remember the Lord your God” (1 Ne. 17:45). JW could
75. Flood, “Some Experimental Games,” 39.
76. Flood, “Some Experimental Games,” 40.
77. Flood, “Some Experimental Games,” 41.
78. Flood, “Some Experimental Games,” 42.
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have been speaking for both himself and Nephi when he sums up his
perception of AA: “He requires great virtue but doesn’t have it himself.
. . . He can’t stand success.”79
And so although the unequal results do not excuse or justify Laman
and Lemuel’s behavior, the asymmetry does provide some insight into
why they act as they do. Amid all these compelling parallels, we must
note that while AA’s outcomes are stipulated ex ante and he has no input
or say as to their disproportion, Laman and Lemuel have power over
time to influence the outcomes that they receive. AA struggles helpless
against a fixed universe of results, but Laman and Lemuel have constant
invitations from both their father and Nephi to step up and claim their
rightful place as leaders.
While Laman and Lemuel (and Nephi) must bear a material share
of responsibility for their respective situations, the conflicts inherited
by their children and further descendants increasingly resemble the
fixed outcomes faced by AA and JW. The violent split between Laman
and Lemuel and their followers on the one hand, who swear to kill
Nephi (2 Ne. 5:4), and Nephi and his followers on the other (including
Sam, Jacob, and Joseph) produces two critical effects: (1) the shadow
for future interaction between the two groups shortens radically and
(2) inequality between the two groups widens dramatically.
As for future interaction, Nephi takes his people, who come to be
known as “the people of Nephi,” or “Nephites” (Jacob 1:14), and flees
“into the wilderness . . . journey[ing] in the wilderness for the space of
many days” (2 Ne. 5:5–9). Now in two different places, the Nephites and
the people of Laman (or “Lamanites”) develop independently and at a
distance from one another, having ruptured over a fierce difference of
opinion.
Drastic inequality develops immediately between the two groups.
Nephi relates that when they depart into the wilderness, they take with
them “the plates of brass; and also the ball, or compass, which was prepared for my father by the hand of the Lord . . . [and] the sword of Laban”
(2 Ne. 5:12, 14). These items are the crown jewels of the family’s shared
travels, and their significance cannot be overstated. We know that the
brothers travel together to Jerusalem to get the plates and obtain them at
great personal risk. Laban’s sword comes from the same excursion. The
compass that leads them through the wilderness holds such deep importance that the Nephites subsequently pass it down from king to king as
79. Flood, “Some Experimental Games,” 42.
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part of the rites of passage along with the plates and sword (Mosiah 1:16).
While Nephi has legitimate claim to the items (having personally slain
Laban by Laban’s sword, obtained the plates, and exercised the faith
necessary to make the compass work), Laman and Lemuel as the eldest
also have had strong claim to the items (and would certainly have had
sturdy incentive to forget the nuances of their acquisition and prior use).
Nephi’s unilateral settlement of the most prized items from his late
father’s estate lays the foundation for a lasting narrative of grievances
and division between the two nations. Nearly five hundred years later
when (Nephite) Ammon and (Lamanite) Lamoni happen upon Lamoni’s
father, a Lamanite king, the father’s immediate response is, “Whither
art thou going with this Nephite, who is one of the children of a liar? . . .
[T]hese Nephites . . . are sons of a liar. Behold, he robbed our fathers;
and now his children are also come among us that they may, by their
cunning and their lyings, deceive us, that they again may rob us of our
property” (Alma 20:10, 13). The Lamanites apparently never forget that
the Nephites had taken away what they view as their rightful inheritance.
The prized items (plates, sword, and compass) allow the Nephites to
maintain more sophisticated standards of construction (2 Ne. 5:15–16),
weapons manufacture (2 Ne. 5:14), and education (2 Ne. 5:29–34), leading to wealth and prosperity (2 Ne. 5:17, 27). Whereas Nephites build
temples like Solomon’s (based on descriptions in the brass plates, 2 Ne.
5:16), clothe themselves well (Jacob 2:17–22), and learn to farm land and
raise livestock effectively (Enos 1:21), the Lamanites live in tents, wander
“about in the wilderness with a short skin girdle about their loins,” and
feed on “beasts of prey” (Enos 1:20).
Further, the ascendance of Nephite culture and the deprivation experienced by Lamanites give rise to two distinct narratives. In the Nephite
worldview, the Nephites are “industrious” (2 Ne. 5:17), “fair and delightsome” (2 Ne. 5:21), wealthy (Jacob 1:16), and hopeful that the Lamanites
will return to “the knowledge of the truth” about God (Jacob 7:24; Enos
1:13–19). In that same view, the Lamanites are, by contrast, “an idle people, full of mischief and subtlety” (2 Ne. 5:24), possessed of “an eternal
hatred against [the Nephites]” (Jacob 7:24), and a “wild, and ferocious,
and a blood-thirsty people, full of idolatry and filthiness” (Enos 1:20; see
also Jacob 3:5, Jarom 1:6). These descriptions reflect (even more closely
than Nephi’s view of Laman and Lemuel) JW’s judgments that AA is
“a shady character,” “shiftless,” “crazy,” and unintelligent.80
80. Flood, “Some Experimental Games,” 41–42.
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Because Nephites are literate and only their records remain, we catch
mere snippets of the Lamanite narrative. For much of the Book of Mormon, until Ammon provides an eyewitness account of the Lamanite
worldview not based on hearsay, we read only staid accounts of Laman
ites hating Nephites and wanting to shed their blood (a narrative that
applies as much in the Nephite consciousness when Laman and Lemuel are alive as it does hundreds of years later). The Ammon account,
recounted after hundreds of years of conflict, shows a Lamanite selfnarrative that remains surprisingly rooted in the original events that
transpire at the split of the two nations. Nephites are “liars,” who are
“cunning” and wish to deceive in order to continually rob Lamanites of
their property (Alma 20:10, 13; see also Mosiah 10:11–17). It is not lost
on the Lamanites that the Nephites possess more learning (since they
are “cunning”) and more wealth, but that wealth continues to be viewed
in terms of Nephi’s robbery of the family inheritance. In the Lamanite
worldview, we can see AA’s torment reiterated: They will not share.
A simple summary of the Prisoner’s Dilemma between the two
nations can be modeled as follows:
Nephites
Cooperate

Defect

Cooperate

Lamanites maintain
mutual peace (R)
Nephites maintain
mutual peace (R)

Lamanites maintain
unilateral peace (S)
Nephites make
unilateral war (T)

Defect

Lamanites make
unilateral war (T)
Nephites maintain
unilateral peace (S)

Lamanites make mutual
war (P)
Nephites make mutual
war (P)

Lamanites

Figure 8.

In each of these cases, the asymmetric outcomes favor the Nephites
except where the Nephites are on the receiving end of a sucker’s payoff
(S). As we have learned, these outcomes must meet Axelrod’s two conditions truly to represent a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
For either side, taking the spoils of war with no resistance from the
other side (T) would have seemed the best possible outcome (for the
Nephites, perhaps as the preface to a Lamanite return to paths of rectitude; for the Lamanites, as payback). Mutual peace (R) is preferable to
mutual war (P) for economic, social, and other reasons, and both R and
T stand superior to being utterly ravaged (S). The outcomes do seem to
follow a T > R > P > S hierarchy.
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As for the second Axelrod condition, it is hard to say whether, in
each case, the product of mutual peace is worth more to one or the other
side than the average gains of taking all spoils and receiving a sucker’s
payoff. For Nephites, this is almost certainly the case. In times of mutual
peace (R), the Nephites enjoy their ornate temples, work hard in their
fields, and improve themselves in learning.
In the same circumstances, Lamanites live from day to day, hunting
what they can and providing as well as possible. The Book of Mormon
suggests that the Lamanites have fewer gainful activities to fill their time,
which makes war more attractive because score-settling T could be the
best chance for a good outcome.81 Speaking to the role of T in the second
condition (which says that the reward for mutual cooperation should be
greater than the average of the temptation payoff and the sucker’s payoff), Axelrod explains that the second condition is so important because
the two sides to a conflict should not be able to “get out of their dilemma
by taking turns exploiting each other. This assumption means that an
even chance of exploitation and being exploited [should not be] as good
an outcome for a player as mutual cooperation.”82 Because of the asymmetry in Nephite-Lamanite payoffs, however, it could be said that the
Lamanites prefer the “even chance of exploitation and being exploited,”
since the reward of mutual cooperation is not much of a reward. In a
society where mutual peace (R) yields washed-out takings, the Lamanites naturally find their equilibrium point.
Although the Nephites profess a longing to reconcile differences
with the Lamanites, no Nephite makes any effective effort to realize this
desire in a period that spans hundreds of years. Jacob relates that “many
means were devised to reclaim and restore the Lamanites to the knowledge of the truth” (Jacob 7:24). Sadly, the record provides little detail
on the nature of these labors, but Jacob laments that “it all was vain, for
81. When the Nephites are prepared, mutual war (P-P) does not often play well
for the Lamanites; however, when the Lamanites are able to catch the Nephites
off-guard, as they do in attacking the remnant of the people of King Noah, the
temptation payoff (T) often yields rich dividends. An example of the efficacy of
T for the Lamanites appears in Mosiah 24, where the Lamanites have unilaterally attacked and overcome the people of King Noah. In this setting, the king of
the Lamanites engages a Nephite named Amulon to teach his people the ways
and language of the people of Nephi, which causes this pocket of Lamanites to
“increase in riches, . . . to trade one with another and wax great, and . . . to be a
cunning and a wise people, as to the wisdom of the world” (Mosiah 24:7).
82. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, 10.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol52/iss2/6
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[the Lamanites] delighted in wars and bloodshed, and they had an eternal hatred against us, their brethren. And they sought by the power of
their arms to destroy us continually” (Jacob 7:24). This Nephite belief in
eternal Lamanite hatred and continual war appears so often that we as
readers are left to wonder whether the Nephites could truly accept peace
from adversaries perceived to be so unscrupulously evil.
Fueled by their deeply ingrained contrary narratives, the two nations
descend into a vicious circle. The Nephites become richer, more educated,
more sophisticated, and enjoy ever higher standards of living, while the
Lamanites appear to subsist at lower levels. While the Nephites look
down on the Lamanites for their apparent dirtiness and lack of industry
(despite declarations of concern for Lamanite souls), Lamanites hate
Nephites for their wealth and alleged guile. The inequality combined
with mutual distrust and enmity pushes the nations apart, which leads
to wars, which fuel further misunderstandings, which lead to more wars
(see, for example, Jarom 1:13–14; Omni 1:2–3, 10, 23–24; W of M 1:13–14;
Mosiah 1:13–14; 10:11–17; Alma 16:2).83 The shadow of the future for the
two nations is so short as to be practically nil.
Ammon as a Book of Mormon Standard: Lengthening the Shadow
of the Future, Eliminating Asymmetry and Territorial Invasion
This state of affairs continues for the better part of five hundred years,
from the time when the nations split, sometime between 588 and
570 bc, until the time when Ammon enters the kingdom of Lamoni, in
83. In this context, the interactions between Lamanites and Nephites that
occur at the demise of King Noah should be briefly noted. Noah is an ineffective monarch who is ultimately burned to death by his own priests, appearing
in chapters 11 to 19 of the book of Mosiah. Weak after years of poor rule, two
separate offshoots of Noah’s Nephite people are overtaken and occupied by
Lamanites. In the midst of seemingly endless Nephite-Lamanite wars, we see
an episode where Lamanites occupy Nephite land and exact heavy (50 percent)
taxes from Nephites (Mosiah 19:22) and place heavy burdens on them (Mosiah
24:9, 14). A number of controversies and standoffs occur between the Lamanite
and Nephite groups, with the end effect that both groups of Nephites devise
plans to escape from Lamanite occupation and return to live in the Nephite
capital of Zarahemla. Far from signaling a dawn of Nephite-Lamanite cooperation, these episodes illustrate both the lengths to which Nephites will go to
distance themselves from Lamanites (22:10–16; 24:21–25) and the propensity
of certain Nephites to exploit the Nephite-Lamanite conflict to their personal
advantage (as did Amulon, 24:1–8).
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approximately 90 bc. The Book of Mormon describes Ammon, along
with his brothers Aaron, Omner, and Himni, as a son of the Nephite
King Mosiah (Mosiah 27:34). After a rebellious youth, the princes
experience a miraculous conversion and determine to go preach to the
Lamanites (Mosiah 28:1–9; Alma 17:1–8).84
Ammon (who is described in Alma 17:18 as “chief ” among his brothers) strikes out alone on his mission to the “land of Ishmael,” a Lamanite
enclave (Alma 17:19). Arriving with a peaceful mission, Ammon finds
himself immediately seized, bound, and brought before the king of the
land, a man named Lamoni. The text tells us that Lamanite law and custom gave royal prerogative when Nephites were captured, leaving it “to the
pleasure of the king to slay them, or to retain them in captivity, or to cast
them into prison, or to cast them out of his land” (Alma 17:20). In response
to his cooperative approach, Ammon faces potential outcomes that read
like defection mad libs. First move: Ammon, S, Lamanites, T, and we are
not surprised to see the Lamanites defect in arresting Ammon as part of
their perpetual war against the Nephites. Cultural and historical considerations aside, the Lamanites choose an equilibrium point strategy with no
incentive to do otherwise.
With Ammon set before him, Lamoni asks “if it were [Ammon’s]
desire to dwell in the land among the Lamanites, or among his people”
(Alma 17:22). Lamoni could have expected only a negative answer to this
question—the Book of Mormon gives no prior example of a Nephite
who voluntarily goes to live among Lamanites—suggesting that he asks
it merely to bait Ammon and help him determine which of the short
straws Ammon is about to draw.
Ammon responds: “Yea, I desire to dwell among this people for a
time; yea, and perhaps until the day I die” (Alma 17:23). Beyond simple
cooperation, Ammon’s statement concurrently expresses ground rules
for future engagement. Where Lamoni thought he was dealing with a
typical one-shot (or short-term) conflict (in which the equilibrium point
demands mutual defection), Ammon has just told him that their future
dealings are potentially indefinite. In Axelrod’s terms, Ammon has just
84. The narrator of this portion of the Book of Mormon (the penultimate
Book of Mormon prophet, Mormon) frames the mission to the Lamanites in
terms of familiar inequality tropes, recording that the sons of Mosiah were
brave to face “a wild and a hardened and a ferocious people; a people who
delighted in murdering the Nephites, and robbing and plundering them; . . .
yet they sought to obtain these things by murdering and plundering, that they
might not labor for them with their own hands” (Alma 17:14).
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol52/iss2/6
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lengthened the shadow of the future, and we might expect accordingly
that his Lamanite hosts will be more amenable to cooperative peace.
Lamoni’s immediate response is fairly delirious: “Lamoni was much
pleased with Ammon, and caused that his bands should be loosed; and
he would that Ammon should take one of his daughters to wife” (Alma
17:24). The Lamanite king could have executed, imprisoned, or exiled
Ammon, all of which the text suggests were in his power. Ammon is a
Nephite, with all that symbolizes and entails, and Lamoni is a Lamanite.
The inequality and grievances between the two nations have not changed,
but Ammon’s cooperative affirmation changes Lamoni’s incentives. If
the Nephite desires to interact with Lamoni and his people on an ongoing basis and Lamoni also desires ongoing interaction due to Ammon’s
sincere cooperation, then conventional opportunities to defect no longer make sense. Lamoni breaks tradition and offers to make Ammon
one of the family rather than eliminate him (a mirror reversal of the
state of affairs at the time the nations split when Laman and Lemuel
want to end family relations by killing Nephi).
Ammon declines Lamoni’s generous offer, asking to take up employment as one of Lamoni’s servants instead and become a shepherd and
stableman for the king (Alma 17:25). What follows is one of the Book
of Mormon’s most famous passages wherein Ammon defends Lamoni’s
flocks from marauding Lamanites who are enemies of the crown, slaying
some by slingshot and slicing off the arms of others by sword (Alma 17:26–
38). Having guarded the king’s property, Ammon goes right back to watering royal flocks and attending to the stable (Alma 17:39; 18:9). Ammon’s
loyalty and diligence make such an impression on Lamoni that (after a
period of utter speechlessness) he asks Ammon by what power he performs his great acts (Alma 18:14–21). Ammon tells the king that his power
comes from God and proceeds to preach the entire message that he came
to share, leading Lamoni and many in his kingdom to convert to Ammon’s
message and adopt his cooperative approach (Alma 18:22–19:36).
With Lamoni converted, Ammon and Lamoni set out to free
Ammon’s brother Aaron (who is also arrested by Lamanites, albeit with
a less successful outcome than Ammon), and on the way they have their
telling encounter with Lamoni’s father (Alma 20:8–13). After his initial
outrage, Lamoni’s father draws his sword on Lamoni and, outmatched
by Ammon, is thrust to the ground and told that his life is forfeit unless
he cedes complete autonomy to Lamoni to run his kingdom without
oversight (Alma 20:14–25). When Lamoni’s father sees what Lamoni
earlier saw—namely that Ammon has genuine regard for Lamanites and
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desires long-term interaction with them—he also wishes to understand
Ammon’s motivation and is ultimately converted along with thousands
in his kingdom (Alma 20:26–27; 22:1–26; 23:1–5).
Taking a step back to consider Ammon, we see a Nephite prince
(son of the man who is the primary caretaker of the plates, sword, and
compass) who leaves his homeland to dwell among a historical enemy,
works in the employ of that enemy to fulfill relatively menial tasks, and
(having made a friend of the enemy) defends the king’s property against
potential threats. Like the TFT (tit-for-tat) strategy that won Axelrod’s
tournaments, Ammon’s cooperative strategy is nice (Ammon is not the
first to defect) where the Lamanites are aggressive, forgiving (Ammon
holds no grudge in relation to Lamanite defection/arrest and promptly
cooperates when the Lamanites want to cooperate) where the Lamanites show an initial reluctance to forget past Nephite wrongs, and clear
(the text shows that Lamoni and Lamoni’s father recognize Ammon’s
intent to cooperate) where the Lamanites are initially unpredictable.
Unlike TFT, Ammon’s strategy in regard to Lamoni and his people is
not immediately retaliatory or provokable, which is to say that Ammon
is not quick to react to defection. Ammon’s cooperative response is in
fact stronger than TFT—not a “tit-for-tat” strategy but a “tit-for-twotats” or “tit-for-multiple-tats” strategy (TFMT). The result of this modification is that Ammon’s strategy is inherently more risky, since the
Lamanites could be more likely to defect if they think there is no likelihood that Ammon will retaliate. Ammon’s facility with the slingshot
and sword, while not aimed at Lamoni or his people directly (at least
not those with fealty to the crown), might arguably have some deterrent
effect that helps Ammon appear provokable without his actually being
provokable. And it is notable that in relation to Lamoni’s father, Ammon
does follow a TFT strategy almost to the letter.
As already noted, Ammon significantly lengthens the shadow of
future interaction between himself and his Lamanite interlocutors. In
response, as Axelrod predicts, the Lamanites begin to cooperate with
Ammon, and a cycle of peaceful mutual cooperation (R) emerges from
what had previously been an unbreakable cycle of warring mutual defection (P). This process of adoptive change from one cycle to another and
the study of how various Prisoner’s Dilemma strategies might collectively fare against one another are points that Axelrod explores in his
study of what he calls “territorial systems.”85
85. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, 160.
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A territorial system is a community of individuals using the same
strategy who are grouped together as neighbors, and the system is stable
if foreign strategies cannot “invade” it. “A strategy,” explains Axelrod,
“can invade another if it can get a higher score than the population average in that environment.”86 Axelrod goes on:
In other words, a single individual using a new strategy can invade a
population of natives if the newcomer does better with a native than
a native does with another native. If no strategy can invade the population of natives, then the native strategy is said to be collectively stable.
To extend these concepts to territorial systems, suppose that a single
individual using a new strategy is introduced into one of the neighborhoods of a population where everyone else is using a native strategy. One
can say that the new strategy territorially invades the native strategy if
every location in the territory will eventually convert to the new strategy.
Then one can say that native strategy is territorially stable if no strategy can
territorially invade it.87

Applying this to the Nephite-Lamanite context, we know that NephiteNephite interaction is stable enough to support significant commerce
and that Nephites are led by kings who encourage them to “walk in the
ways of truth and soberness; . . . to love one another, and to serve one
another” (Mosiah 4:15). The Lamanite-Lamanite interaction that we
see through Ammon shows Lamanites who steal property from fellow
Lamanites and fear execution from their king in return for failure to fulfill duties properly (Alma 17:27–29). Where Ammon has a clear TFMT
or TFT strategy, the Lamanite strategy in regard to other Lamanites is
more ambiguous.
Ammon’s entry into Lamanite lands followed by subsequent mass
conversion to his way of thinking and acting seems to provide an
example of what Axelrod might refer to as “territorial invasion.” To use
Axelrod’s formulation, Ammon is “a single individual using a new strategy . . . introduced into one of the neighborhoods of a population where
everyone else is using a native strategy.”88 In guarding the king’s flocks
better than other servants (and then continuing on quietly with other
tasks) and guarding Lamoni against his father’s wrath, Ammon fares
better with Lamanite natives than Lamanites do with one another. The
strategy that Lamanites follow with one another lacks collective stability
86. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, 160.
87. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, 160.
88. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, 160.
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perhaps because it is unpredictable. As the Lamanites recognize the
clarity of what Ammon has to offer, they “convert to the new strategy”
en masse.
It is worth noting that the account of Ammon’s “territorial invasion”
provides a concrete example of a phenomenon that Axelrod explains
only in theory. Axelrod gives practical, non-tournament-based examples to illustrate the “shadow of the future” (such as the live-and-let-live
system of trench warfare during World War I)89 and other Prisoner’s
Dilemma–related principles, but his examples for territorial systems
and the ability of an individual to invade such systems stick closely to
theoretically modeled and tournament-based results.90
Moreover, beyond lengthening the shadow of the future for Lamanite interaction and territorially invading Lamanite culture, Ammon also
takes the first step toward eradicating the asymmetry of the outcomes
experienced between the two nations. In a “Nixon to China” spirit, only
a Nephite prince could symbolically debase himself for the Lamanites in a way that would set the conditions for equalizing the payoffs
received by both nations. Soon after the mass Lamanite conversions, the
equalization of payoffs becomes a practical as well as a symbolic reality.
Following their “territorial invasion” that began with Ammon and
the subsequent mass conversion, the converted Lamanites, who fittingly come to be known as the people of Ammon, or “Ammonites,”
forswear all violence and bury their weapons (Alma 27:26, 57:6; 24:1–18).
Unarmed, the Ammonites suffer punishing slaughter from neighboring,
unconverted Lamanites who had been “stirred up” by former Nephites,
and their act of supreme cooperation in the face of brutal defection
(practicing what they have now accepted as their strategy) paradoxically
causes more mass conversion and territorial invasion among unconverted Lamanites who participate in or at least witness the slaughter
(Alma 24:19–27). To protect the nation that has converted to their strategy, the Nephites resolve to provide for the common defense of the
Ammonites and give them land to inhabit in a region named Jershon by
the sea (Alma 27:22–30).
And so we see a striking equalization of the payoffs to both nations
that goes so far as to tip the scales in favor of the converted Lamanites.

89. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, 73–87.
90. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, 160–68.
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Where previously the Nephites had superior weapons, commerce, and
education, while the Lamanites lived from day to day, the Nephites
now give the Ammonites a seafront land of “inheritance” and vow to
protect them against their enemies. To defend the new political order,
the Nephites are quickly drawn into “a tremendous battle [with the
non-Ammonite Lamanites]; yea, even such an one as never had been
known among all the people in the land from the time Lehi left Jerusalem” (Alma 28:2). The battle causes “tremendous slaughter among
the people of Nephi . . . [and] great mourning and lamentation” (Alma
28:3–4). Far from a symbolic gesture, the Nephites paid for their Ammonite defense pact with blood and sacrifice. Surprisingly, the Book of
Mormon does not describe any political blowback from the Nephites
against the Ammonites for the Nephite suffering. Nephite cooperation
was robust enough to withstand significant stresses even when Nephite
cooperative gestures worked to discount the value (to the Nephites) of
peace with the Ammonites.
With outcomes to the two nations now symmetrical (or even
skewed in favor of the Ammonites), the Nephites and Ammonites live
together in peace for decades. Where as Lamanites they had been “an
idle people, full of mischief and subtlety” (2 Ne. 5:24), “wild, and ferocious, . . . full of idolatry and filthiness” (Enos 1:20), the Ammonites
are now viewed by the Nephites as “a zealous and beloved people, a
highly favored people of the Lord” (Alma 27:30). Where AA and JW
are locked together in an asymmetric struggle with no way to amend
the outcomes, Ammon’s mission followed by Nephite reciprocation
allows payoffs to align and the nations to cease warring based on perceived unequal treatment. The Nephite-Lamanite cycle that had been
unremittingly vicious becomes (in relation to a subset of Lamanites)
just as perpetually virtuous when ongoing interaction between the two
nations becomes a matter of generosity and life-and-death necessity.
As an important aside, we should recognize that the method of payoff equalization that the Nephites practice with the Ammonites works
so well that they resort to the same strategy when contention arises
decades later with another faction. In 29 to 30 ad, the Nephites are
dealing with Mafia-like bands of robbers who seriously disrupt their
political and economic order. The Nephites are able to broker peace
with some of these robbers, and the Book of Mormon relates that the
Nephites “granted unto those robbers who had entered into a covenant
to keep the peace of the land, who were desirous to remain Lamanites,
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lands, according to their numbers, that they might have, with their
labors, wherewith to subsist upon; and thus they did establish peace
in all the land” (3 Ne. 6:3). Faced with constant defection from warring
robbers, the Nephites seek to equalize payments to their counterparty,
appreciating from their Ammonite experience that offering land (giving
the enemy somewhere to labor and “wherewith to subsist upon”) can be
a powerful tool in equalizing payoffs and bringing peace.
Book of Mormon history continues for some five hundred years
following the Ammonite experience, but the patterns of conflict and
the lessons learned can be explained by the same principles we have
already explored. We are not surprised that incursions by the anarchist
Gadianton robbers occur at a time when “the people began to be distinguished by ranks, according to their riches and their chances for learning; yea, some were ignorant because of their poverty, and others did
receive great learning because of their riches. . . . And the people were
divided one against another; and they did separate from one another
into tribes” (3 Ne. 6:12, 7:2). Once Jesus Christ appears and imparts wisdom and grace directly to Nephites and Lamanites alike, we are again
not surprised to hear that nearly two hundred years of peace ensue in
conditions where the people “had all things in common among them;
therefore there were not rich and poor, bond and free, but they were
all made free, and partakers of the heavenly gift” (4 Ne. 1:3). And as the
Nephites and Lamanites begin their final, nauseating decline, we see
“exceeding riches” and vanity making a last appearance as various tribes
go their separate ways to close scope for future interaction once and for
all (1:43). The human conditions for long shadows of interaction and
symmetrical payoffs (and the opposite thereof) yield surprisingly consistent outcomes in the Book of Mormon text.
Conclusion
If the lessons learned from applying the Prisoner’s Dilemma to the Book
of Mormon had to be summed up in three lines, the lines might read:
The shadow of the future is important. Territorial invasion is interesting. Equalization of payoffs is indispensable. Axelrod’s research amply
demonstrates the first two of these three postulates (even if the Book of
Mormon provides a compelling practical example of the second), but
the Book of Mormon uniquely illustrates that where two groups are
locked in a Prisoner’s Dilemma conflict with asymmetric payoffs, the
payoffs must be balanced and aligned for the groups to have a hope of
consistently achieving mutually beneficial outcomes.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol52/iss2/6
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Often human judgment can get in the way of vital equalization. Like
Nephites, we can see others as unclean. Like JW, we can view an interlocutor as crazy or unintelligent. Stuck underfoot, we may say like AA
or a Lamanite that an oppressor is unwilling to share ill-gotten gains.
Whatever the excuses or reasons, Ammon shows that those with privilege must be willing to roll up sleeves and get hands dirty to make relations clean, while Lamoni and his people show that those at a relative
disadvantage must lift themselves up. The Book of Mormon suggests
that parents, politicians, religious interlocutors, social opponents, and
others must seriously consider whether their conflicts might stem (at
least in part) from a payoff imbalance and, if so, how to remedy the
imbalance to aid cooperation. Once parties are linked arm in arm and
locked eye to eye, they can find a common path that stretches out to the
horizon.
In a final estimation, the Prisoner’s Dilemma and its application in the
Book of Mormon provide another way of looking at the Book of Mormon’s core messages of atonement, redemption, and the gospel of Jesus
Christ. Knowledge of Jesus Christ and Christian teachings might motivate the Nephites to foster concern for the Lamanites and their condition,
but only after Ammon takes action to equalize payoffs to the Lamanites
and lengthen the scope for future interaction do the Lamanites become
amenable to Christian teachings. Just as Nephites teach that the suffering
of Jesus Christ would make atonement between the imperfect actions of
men and the laws of God (2 Ne. 2:5–10), so too Nephites eventually learn
that their belief in that divine Atonement should spur efforts to make
practical atonement for unequal payoffs experienced by their long-lost
brethren. As the prophet Alma suggests, the works of good men and
women can create space for a “preparatory redemption” in this world
that hints at an ultimate redemption that will hopefully follow in the next
world (Alma 13:3).
The Book of Mormon appears to have Prisoner’s Dilemma patterns
and conflicts running from its earliest to its latest pages. In a book variously decried as “chloroform in print,”91 “a prosy detail of imaginary

91. Alan Wolfe, “Chloroform in Print: Does the Book of Mormon Get a Bad
Rap?” Slate (May 17, 2010), http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/books/2010/05/
chloroform_in_print.html. This quote is attributed to Mark Twain (Samuel
Clemens).
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history,”92 and “so compulsively Biblical that all the action seems to
take place underwater,”93 we find intricate stories that illustrate and illuminate some of the Prisoner’s Dilemma’s harder-to-grasp applications.
While the Prisoner’s Dilemma does appear in many contexts—in life
as in literature, in fact as in fiction—it is nonetheless remarkable that a
nineteenth-century work contains it so fully and so consistently.
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